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Abstract
This article contributes to literature assessing power 
dynamics in the emerging global migration governance. 
Drawing on Barnett and Finnemore’s analysis of bureau-
cratic culture in international organizations, it investi-
gates inter-agency cooperation between the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 
International Labour Organization in the promotion of 
refugees’ right to work in the last two decades. While the 
mandate and activities of both organizations appear to sig-
nificantly intersect in the promotion of this right, practical 
constraints related to states’ diverging interests, differences 
in institutional structure, and discursive ambivalence in 
the situation of the refugee worker limit coordination and 
effectiveness.
Résumé
Cet article contribue aux études des relations de pouvoir 
dans la gouvernance mondiale des migrations. S’inspirant 
des travaux de Barnett et Finnemore sur la culture bureau-
cratique des organisations internationales, il analyse la 
coopération, lors des deux dernières décennies, entre le 
Haut-Commissariat aux Réfugiés des Nations Unies et 
l’Organisation Internationale du Travail en matière de 
promotion du droit au travail des réfugiés. Le mandat et les 
activités des deux organisations semblent faire preuve de 
complémentarité dans la promotion de ce droit. Cependant, 
des contraintes pratiques liées aux intérêts divergents des 
États, des différences de structure institutionnelle au sein 
des deux organisations ainsi que les ambivalences de leur 
discours sur le réfugié travailleur limitent la coordination 
et l’efficacité entre les deux organisations. 
Introduction
This article explores the cooperation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in the promotion of refugees’ right to work during the 
last two decades. It offers empirical insights into an example 
of collaboration between international organizations that 
has yet to attract much attention. It also aims to contrib-
ute to literature critically assessing power dynamics in the 
emerging global migration governance with a focus on its 
institutional dimension. The article shows that, in spite of 
significant potential for both United Nations agencies to 
jointly promote refugees’ right to work, achievements in 
the 21st century have remained limited. An explanation 
is offered. While the significance of an inauspicious inter-
national environment cannot be understated, pathologies 
related to the bureaucratic culture of international organ-
izations also weakened joint achievements.
The next section develops the theoretical framework. 
The article subsequently points to intersections between 
the ILO’s and the UNHCR’s mandates to promote refugees’ 
right to work and presents their joint activities on the issue. 
Three challenges to effective cooperation are then presented: 
limited state interest in and institutional competition over 
the focus of UNHCR-ILO cooperation, organizational 
obstacles within both agencies, and broader lack of visibility 
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of the refugee worker. The second and the third challenges 
are related to what Barnett and Finnemore label “bureau-
cratic pathologies.”1 The conclusion discusses the signifi-
cance of the findings.
Exploring Interagency Cooperation in Emerging 
Global Migration Governance
As Geiger and Pécoud recently noted, although interna-
tional organizations (IOs) have become considerably more 
significant in the politics of migration since the end of the 
Cold War, research focusing specifically on IOs in this 
field is still emerging.2 The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) and the UNHCR have attracted 
most scholarly attention.3 In contrast, literature on the 
ILO is limited, despite the ILO’s engagement with migra-
tion policy since its establishment in 1919, reflected in the 
migration governance suggestions of the ILO’s first director 
general, Albert Thomas.4 This research can therefore shed 
light onto the IO that until the end of 2014 heads the Global 
Migration Group, one of the main forums of emerging 
global migration governance.5
In addition, the article adds to the small number of 
studies exploring interrelations between IOs in this field. 
Among these studies, Newland suggests a set of patterns of 
competition, cooperation, and transformation among IOs.6 
Betts focuses on the UNHCR’s response to an increasingly 
complex and competitive global governance architecture in 
which its leadership over the global refugee regime is chal-
lenged.7 Drawing on a governmentality framework, Geiger 
shows how IOs such as the IOM cooperate with European 
Union (EU) institutions to develop migration regulations at 
the EU periphery.8 Focusing on the UNHCR’s and IOM’s 
joint legitimization of states’ migrant return policies, Koch 
highlights the significance of state interest in inter-IOs 
cooperation and the joint capacity of the two IOs.9 Similarly, 
this article will address state interest and IO capacity, albeit 
in a different international and institutional environment. 
To this purpose, I shall show the relevance of Barnett 
and Finnemore’s discussion of bureaucratic culture and 
“bureaucratic pathologies” in IOs in the analysis of inter-
agency cooperation.
Barnett and Finnemore are critical of the functional-
ist assumption of most international relations scholar-
ship, which focuses on why IOs exist rather than on how 
they work. Drawing on literature on organizations and 
on Weber, they argue that states grant IOs legitimacy 
because rational bureaucracies make impersonal rules on 
cross-border issues. Realist and neoliberal institutionalist 
accounts respectively contend that IOs gain authority pri-
marily because of their power over material resources and 
information. In contrast, Barnett and Finnemore state that 
IOs gain authority because “they use [it] to orient action 
and create social reality … [transforming] information 
into knowledge.”10 IOs not only define norms and categor-
ies in international law, they also interpret the meaning of 
these categories and promote their worldwide diffusion. Yet 
what makes IOs efficient as impersonal, rational bureau-
cracies also fosters internal problems, which Barnett and 
Finnemore refer to as “bureaucratic pathologies”: “We call 
‘pathologies’ those dysfunctions that are attributable to 
bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic pressures 
and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-
professed goals.”11 Accordingly, IOs can create norms that 
contradict each other (“irrationality of rationalization”); 
tolerate breaches of long-established norms (“normalization 
of deviance”); focus so much on universal standard as to 
ignore the local context (“bureaucratic universalism”); iso-
late themselves from scrutiny and feedback (“insulation”); 
and are riddled with internal struggles (“cultural contesta-
tion”).12 Bureaucratic expansion can fuel such pathologies, 
and so can factors external to IOs, such as funding short-
ages.13 In the following empirical analysis, I intend to show 
that bureaucratic pathologies not only weaken the authority 
of single IOs but can also impede inter-agency cooperation. 
Barnett and Finnemore’s framework has yet to be used in 
this perspective, which could fruitfully contribute to global 
migration-governance literature. I shall return to this last 
point in the conclusion.
Intersections in UNHCR and ILO Mandates and 
Framework for Inter-Agency Cooperation
The right to work is protected in binding universal human 
rights treaties, most significantly in articles 6 to 8 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), while the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and other core UN human rights treat-
ies such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child protect against 
forced labour and slavery.14 Given that all UN agencies pro-
mote compliance with human rights treaties, it can be said 
that the UNHCR and the ILO mandates intersect, as they 
share this normative basis.
Refugee rights are more specifically defined in the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee 
Convention).15 The Refugee Convention stipulates non-
discrimination of refugees in wage-earning employment 
(article 17; the convention recommends that refugees be 
treated like nationals as much as possible), self-employment 
(article 18), and the liberal professions (article 19). More than 
20 countries impose restrictions on article 17. Among them, 
Volume 30 Refuge Number 2
16
a dozen consider the article to be a recommendation, not 
an obligation.16 Because of the Refugee Convention’s obli-
gations, refugees have been excluded from the remit of the 
1990 UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Their Families.17 The UNHCR is mandated to super-
vise the application of the Refugee Convention (article 35). 
The Refugee Convention provisions on the right to work 
do not apply to asylum seekers, as they are not recognized 
refugees.18
The ILO is the only tripartite organization of the UN 
system. Its normative instruments are drafted, adopted, 
and supervised by representatives of governments, employ-
ers, and unions, yet ratification of adopted instruments is 
done by government representatives only. While the ILO 
also focuses on the right to work, the bulk of its conventions 
and standards address rights at work and aim to ensure that 
work is fair and decent. ILO conventions and standards 
apply to all workers, with no discrimination between nation-
als and foreign nationals. Several conventions deal specific-
ally with the rights of migrant workers,19 yet conventions 
and standards dealing specifically with these rights have 
very low levels of ratification.20 Nonetheless, the ILO 1998 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
states four core principles applying to all states, regardless of 
their ratification of related instruments: freedom of associa-
tion and effective recognition of the right to collective bar-
gaining; elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour; effective abolition of child labour; and elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
A specific supervisory mechanism for non-ratifying states 
accompanies these principles.21
Thus, in addition to the common normative base shared by 
the UNHCR and the ILO (universal human rights treaties), it 
can be said that there is a division of labour in the setting and 
supervision of norms. The UNHCR monitors compliance 
with the non-discrimination of refugees in accessing work, 
as defined in the Refugee Convention, whereas the ILO’s 
conventions and standards aim to ensure that all workers, 
including refugees, are treated fairly and involved in “social 
dialogue.” This division of labour does not preclude joint 
activities between the UNHCR and the ILO.
Both agencies launched joined projects to identify and 
foster income-generating activities for refugees in Somalia 
and Sudan in the early 1980s. The Somali project targeted 
women and children who relied almost entirely on humani-
tarian assistance in refugee camps, while the Sudanese pro-
ject aimed to help both refugees and local populations (men 
were the primary group of concern) broaden economic 
activities in poor agricultural regions. 22 In both cases, the 
UNHCR requested the ILO’s assistance and provided fund-
ing aside from other donors. While the two projects targeted 
only a small minority of potential beneficiaries, they trans-
lated for several years into effective income-generation and 
skills-broadening for participants. Long-term sustainability 
was eventually compromised by the outbreak of civil war in 
Somalia and lack of long-term financial support in Sudan.
As these projects were getting off the ground, in 1983, ILO 
director general Francis Blanchard and high commissioner 
for refugees Poul Hartling signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MoU).23 The UNHCR signed MoUs with the 
World Food Programme (WFP) and the IOM, with whom it 
cooperates steadily, only in 1985 (revised in 2002) and 1997 
respectively.24 While acknowledging the UNHCR’s refugee-
protection mandate and the ILO’s social-justice mandate, 
the UNHCR-ILO MoU mentions “common areas of con-
cern” in the treatment and assistance of refugees. Both IOs 
pledge to jointly work on:
• protecting the socio-economic rights of refugees and 
developing new standards giving consideration to the 
vulnerability of refugees;
• fostering the socio-economic integration of refugees 
in their country of residence, and of returning refu-
gees in their countries of origin;
• building refugee skills and developing job opportun-
ities, on the basis of early ILO assistance to UNHCR 
and mutual funding agreements;
• exchanging information between field offices regard-
ing refugee assistance;
• exchanging policy information at headquarter level.
It can be argued that the MoU promisingly expanded 
upon the ILO and the UNHCR’s joint normative basis to 
support refugees’ right to work while fostering their rights 
at work, even though the latter aspect is less specific in the 
agreement than the former. Over the following decades, the 
focus of both IOs experienced significant transformations. 
From the 1980s, the UNHCR became increasingly involved 
in refugee repatriation and took responsibility for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), so that its involvement in the 
socio-economic integration of returning refugees and IDPs 
gained prominence. The role of the UNHCR in humanitar-
ian relief expanded considerably, transforming the IO into 
a leading agency in the field.25 Amid institutional reforms 
centred on the promotion of the Decent Work agenda and 
aiming to increase the ILO’s relevance in a context of global-
ization.26 the ILO also expanded its labour-supporting 
activities in post-conflict situations.27 In parallel, from the 
2000s both IOs were involved in development of a rights-
based discourse on migration, the UNHCR by focusing on 
rights in the context of “mixed migratory flows” while the 
ILO Governing Body mandated the organization to develop 
a plan of action for migrant workers in 2004.28 We shall 
return to the significance of these broad developments for 
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the authority of both IOs over the promotion of refugees’ 
right to work after we have examined their joint activities in 
the last two decades.
UNHCR-ILO Activities in the 21st Century
According to UNHCR and ILO global reports of activities, 
as well as specific project documentation, the main focus of 
UNHCR-ILO cooperation in promotion of refugees’ right 
to work in the 21st century is the transition from relief to 
development. Included are activities to prepare refugees for 
economic reintegration into their country of origin and to 
assist refugees and IDPs once they have returned to their 
country or location of origin. This reflects opportunities to 
jointly promote refugees’ right to work in the field delineated 
in the 1983 UNHCR-ILO MoU.
From 2000, the two IOs promoted micro-finance, taking 
into consideration the financial vulnerability of many refu-
gees, especially female refugees, who wish to set up businesses. 
Activities included the organization of training workshops 
in field offices, publication of the manual Introduction to 
Micro-Finance in Conflict-Affected Communities, and pro-
duction of policy guidelines on micro-finance.29 While the 
UNHCR had used micro-finance before cooperating with 
the ILO, its use expanded considerably from 2000 in the 
context of the UNHCR’s increased focus on refugee liveli-
hoods. According to Azorbo, as of 2011 the UNHCR used 
micro-finance programs in 45 per cent of its country oper-
ations.30 The IO adopted a memorandum of understanding 
with the leading micro-finance institution, the Grameen 
Bank, while continuing to work with the ILO. Yet Azorbo 
notes that training capacity remains very limited, question-
ing the practical impact of micro-finance advocacy, and 
observes that the UNHCR has not released a systematic 
evaluation of its micro-finance activities.
Between 2003 and 2007, Italy provided almost US$1 
million in funding to support establishment of the “ILO-
UNHCR Partnership through Technical Cooperation: 
Socio-economic Integration of Refugees, Returnees and 
Internally Displaced persons.”31 This partnership was 
endorsed at the top of the agencies. In November 2004, ILO 
director general Juan Somavia and high commissioner for 
refugees Ruud Lubbers signed a statement aiming for a 
“strengthened partnership” over the transition from relief 
to development so as to foster sustainable livelihoods and 
poverty reduction. A working group composed of ILO sec-
tions focusing on crisis and reconstruction (InFocus and 
IFP/CRISIS, later renamed ILO/CRISIS) and the UNHCR’s 
Reintegration and Local Settlement Section were set up 
to guide and review projects as well as liaising with other 
departments and both headquarters.32 The partnership 
received more than US$2 million in funding and intervened 
in 15 countries in Africa, Latin America, Central and South 
Asia, and Southeastern Europe.33 The ILO also released a 
review of its above-mentioned projects for African refugees 
in the 1980s, to “guide future work” by the ILO and other 
agencies on the issue as well as “revive the [ILO]’s institu-
tional memory” concerning refugees.34
To give an example of the ILO-UNHCR partnership’s 
projects, in the Maratane refugee camp in Mozambique, 
an ILO consultant, with the support of an ILO team 
based in Zambia and of ILO/CRISIS in Geneva, aimed to 
develop “the socio-economic empowerment of women in 
the refugee community” of the camp in the early 1980s. A 
small group of local women and men was first selected to 
become trainers in business skills. The consultant and the 
trainer then focused on a group of women, who often had 
no previous entrepreneurial experience, to participate in 
a two-week workshop to develop business plans. In a cli-
mate of gender-based discrimination towards women tak-
ing up jobs, workshops were also organized with men and 
women to discuss gender stereotypes in the economic con-
text.35 Collaboration with local governments, and especially 
with financing institutions, was also sought. According to a 
UNHCR press release from 2007, the project was well per-
ceived by participants and expanded to the entire Maratane 
camp, where self-reliance increased. While the original ILO 
report announces a three-year monitoring period, the 2007 
UNHCR press release does not mention the ILO anymore, 
self-reliance activities now being offered by World Relief 
International.36 The promised evaluation after the three-
year period of implementation could not be located.
The Mozambican project added innovation to UNHCR 
practice, especially the training of local trainers among 
refugees.37 Further innovation occurred from the UNHCR 
perspective in Liberia: the UNHCR local field office worked 
with an ILO consultant to foster employment of returning 
refugees. In the face of very high unemployment in post-
war Liberia, employment in the informal economy was pro-
moted with use of ILO community-based training meth-
ods.38 In 2007, ILO/CRISIS expressed high hopes for the 
partnership, stating, “Potentially this program will be able 
to serve the entire refugee population assisted by UNHCR 
as it sets the framework for the rapid deployment of ILO 
livelihood experts to UNHCR’s country operations  … 
This project has proven its effectiveness in coupling ILO’s 
expertise in livelihoods and sustainable development with 
UNHCR’s expertise and mandate to provide protection and 
assistance to refugees, returnees and at times, IDPs, and to 
find durable solutions to their plight.”39
From 2007, however, and alongside the above-mentioned 
micro-finance activities, UNHCR-ILO technical cooper-
ation promoting refugees’ right to work appeared to occur 
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primarily in the context of the UNHCR’s Strengthening 
Protection Capacity Projects (SPCPs). SPCPs started in 2005 
and were funded largely by the European Union. While 
SPCPs took place in a dozen countries, the ILO seldom 
appears to play a prominent role in project design and is 
generally one partner among many. This is not surprising, 
as SPCPs not only aim to improve refugees’ self-reliance but 
also to strengthen capacity of refugee-hosting countries to 
provide protection at the legal and institutional level. One 
exception is the SPCP in Thailand, which had a dedicated 
livelihood component designed jointly by the UNHCR and 
the ILO. The project first identified issues limiting the eco-
nomic participation of Burmese refugees, then launched a 
pilot project in the Mae La camp (the largest refugee camp 
on the Thailand/Myanmar border) aiming to foster vege-
table production, then sales of the produce with develop-
ment of business strategies with a few hundred refugees.40
Further ILO involvement in livelihood activities in the 
Mae La camp is not documented; however, ILO training 
material, such as on the community-based development of 
business skills, is used by NGOs now pursuing livelihood 
activities in cooperation with UNHCR.41 However, the ILO 
does not feature prominently in the increasing number of 
UNHCR publications showing renewed IO interest for the 
issue of refugee livelihoods besides the SPCPs. For instance, 
the UNHCR Global Strategy for Livelihoods for 2014–18 
does not refer to previous ILO-UNHCR cooperation, nor 
does it quote ILO sources on the issue. In contrast, the 
UNHCR highlights its cooperation with the World Food 
Programme.42
To sum up, it appears that a sustained period of bilateral 
technical cooperation between the UNHCR and ILO (2003–
7) entailed knowledge transfer and institutional innovation 
by the UNHCR in more than a dozen field projects world-
wide, followed by a loosening of the partnership between 
the IOs and the absorption of their ties into wider, more 
multilateral projects. The dissemination of ILO knowledge 
to the UNHCR and other partners has occurred primarily 
through the use of ILO publications in the field, yet the con-
tribution of the ILO does not appear to be much recognized 
beyond the field level.
This article considers that such an outcome was not 
inevitable. The UNHCR-ILO partnership might have 
expanded on the basis their shared normative base, early 
technical cooperation, and the 1983 MoU providing a more 
specific framework for normative and technical cooperation. 
Therefore, the following section suggests explanations to the 
limits of the UNHCR-ILO cooperation in the promotion 
of refugees’ right to work in the 21st century. Drawing on 
Barnett and Finnemore’s analytical framework, it focuses 
first on the international environment before addressing 
dynamics within and between the two IOs.
Challenges to UNHCR-ILO Cooperation
Inauspicious International Environment: States’ Lack of 
Interest and Institutional Competition
As Suhrke and Ofstad note, there has long been a “macro-
funding gap” in the relief-development continuum.43 
Donors’ lines of funding for humanitarian and development 
aid are generally distinct. Additionally, funding is often 
more readily available for humanitarian projects than for 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. An ILO representative 
praised the UNHCR-ILO partnership in previous years at a 
UNHCR Executive Committee meeting in 2006, yet noted 
that important projects could not be completed as a result 
of a funding shortage.44 It is reasonable to suggest that such 
funding shortage reflects states’ lack of political will to sup-
port refugees’ right to work in this context. More broadly, the 
UNHCR’s own attempts to lead in the relief-to-development 
issue since the late 1990s, most notably the Brooking 
Process and the Convention Plus initiative, were embraced 
neither by key multilateral institutions nor by a majority of 
states. While especially the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) was, until the mid-2000s, wary of 
UNHCR’s involvement in the development field, states of 
the Global South felt marginalized from the start in the 
Convention Plus process.45 Deschamp and Lohse note 
an increasing multilateral interest in relief-development 
linkages since 2008, with the design of a Framework for 
Ending Displacement in the Aftermath of Conflict by the 
UNHCR, the UNDP, and the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to which the ILO contrib-
utes alongside other IOs. Yet they conclude, “In regard to 
practice, principally reflected in the availability and predict-
ability of funding to bridge the humanitarian-development 
gap … things have not changed much for the better.”46
State-imposed controls on refugee mobility, and in some 
cases, on the right to work, in countries where ILO-UNHCR 
projects took place are equally problematic. In the UNHCR-
ILO project on skill assessment in the Kakuma and Dabaab 
refugee camps in Kenya, refugees were neither allowed to 
leave the camps nor to work for a wage in the country.47 
Such restrictive measures prevent local integration of popu-
lations that should eventually repatriate, yet restrictions 
also maintain refugees in long-term survival situations 
while not decreasing tensions with local hosting commun-
ities. Change in regulations can also hamper self-reliance 
projects. In the Maratane camp project in Mozambique, the 
introduction of mobility control for refugees in a period of 
expansion of self-reliance caused a sudden swell in camp 
population and put pressure on resources.48
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Lack of Institutional Impact of Field Cooperation
A difficult international environment should not imply per 
se that UNHCR and ILO do not have agency over the pro-
motion of refugees’ right to work. It has been argued that, 
since the early 2000s, the UNHCR has designed a relatively 
coherent strategy on refugee resettlement at the normative 
and operational level, and developed linkages with supra-
national and non-governmental agencies, even though this 
strategy has yet to significantly affect states’ willingness to 
resettle refugees.49 In the case of the UNHCR-ILO partner-
ship, however, it appears that the engagement of both IOs’ 
headquarters has been only sporadic. Since 2004, the heads 
of both organizations have not released another joint state-
ment on strengthened cooperation. This can contribute to 
explaining the invisibility of UNHCR-ILO fieldwork within 
each agency.
Tellingly, in an ILO study titled “Integrating Migration 
into Development Planning,” Lucas observes a lack of data 
on the reintegration of refugees in their country of and on 
refugee employment in camps. The paper seems unaware 
of UNHCR work on the issue, and of ILO-UNHCR reports 
on their joint projects, such as in Mozambique and Kenya, 
as this research is not quoted.50 There is no evaluation of 
UNHCR-ILO projects by the agency’s Policy Development 
and Evaluation Service (PDES), whereas there is a series 
of evaluations of UNHCR-WFP projects, as well as a man-
agement response. Among PDES’s New Issues in Refugee 
Research reports, only one discusses potential links 
between the UNHCR and the ILO, arguing that both IOs 
could partner on the issue of domestic work.51 Indeed, the 
ILO increased its focus on domestic work with the adoption 
of the Domestic Workers Convention 2011 (no. 189), and 
many urban refugees (especially women) work in the sec-
tor.52 Three years later, there is no evidence of joint activities 
on the issue.
Within the broader framework of global migration gov-
ernance, UNHCR-ILO cooperation is not discussed in the 
documents released by either IO on the website of the Global 
Migration Group.53 Nor is it mentioned in UN documents 
presenting the view of the UN agencies involved in the 2013 
High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development.54 The 
UNHCR-ILO cooperation therefore appears to be invis-
ible not only within each agency but also to each other, and 
more broadly, to the emerging global migration-governance 
architecture.
Can “bureaucratic pathologies” contribute to explain 
disjunctures between fieldwork and headquarters and 
lack of reciprocal knowledge diffusion? The lack of influ-
ence of field offices on ILO and UNHCR headquarters is 
well known.55 Using Barnett and Finnemore’s typology of 
bureaucratic pathologies, “bureaucratic universalism,” as 
well as “cultural contestation” and “insulation” are appar-
ent. According to former ILO employees Guy Standing 
and William R. Simpson, the ILO, which has experienced 
considerable reforms and thematic broadening over the last 
decades, has difficulty being a standard-setter, a technical-
assistance organization, and a knowledge generator at once.56 
Former ILO director general Juan Somavia also regretted 
the ILO’s lack of internal coherence as well as its tendency to 
resist external scrutiny.57 Wigley stresses that the UNHCR 
is simultaneously caught in a dynamic of permanent “short-
termism,” focusing on the next crisis, while headquarters 
keeps producing guidelines that are not directly related to 
concerns in the field.58 Standing and Wigley also point to 
the climate of intense competition within both agencies, 
which can disrupt efficient communication between the 
field and headquarters. Finally—and this is an issue not 
addressed by Barnett and Finnemore—staff casualization 
can limit dissemination of innovation within both institu-
tions, given the significance of interpersonal relationships 
in the promotion of change within the two IOs.59
Yet there might also be “rational” bureaucratic reasons for 
the limits of the UNHCR-ILO partnership in promotion of 
refugees’ right to work. In the context of intense bureaucratic 
competition for leadership over “relief-to-development” 
and of limited funding, the UNHCR may have opted to 
use the lowest-cost ILO resources (its publications) while 
increasing staff-based partnership with organizations per-
ceived to deliver higher returns in the promotion of its refu-
gee livelihoods strategy (the WFP and the UNDP). As the 
ILO focuses increasingly on issues such as the rights of all 
domestic workers, the ILO may also have so far considered 
it more cost-effective not to intensify cooperation on the 
specific issue of refugees’ right to work.60
The Broader Invisibility of the Refugee Worker
A third issue limiting the visibility of UNHCR-ILO promo-
tion of refugees’ right to work is the lack of recognition of 
the refugee as a worker. While the transition from relief to 
development is essential in post-crisis situations, it seems 
that within both agencies linkages are missing between 
emphasis on the refugee’s ability to provide for his or her 
basic needs (the transitory period) and forms of work that 
go beyond the threshold of survival. For instance, similar-
ities between the refugee worker and the migrant worker 
could be explored. However, on the website of the ILO, there 
is no way to access ILO-UNHCR reports of activities via 
the specific search function of the ILO Labour Migration 
Branch (MIGRANT)’s webpage.61 One has to search via 
other ILO webpages, especially that of the Employment 
Policy Department (EMPLOYMENT), which has absorbed 
ILO/CRISIS. Reviewing the topics of ILO’s International 
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Migrants Working Papers (published regularly since 1995, 
totalling 118 issues so far), none of the papers’ titles deals 
with refugees or, more broadly, forced migrants in the con-
text of labour migration. Individual papers do address the 
issue as part of broader discussions.62
On the side of the UNHCR, a review of PDES’s New Issues 
in Refugee Research (published regularly since 1999) and 
UNHCR evaluation reports shows that the refugee as a 
worker, or refugee labour, is barely ever the primary focus 
of either series. More often, refugee labour is discussed in 
reviews of refugees’ social capital, livelihood approaches, 
reintegration in their country of origin, durable solutions, 
poverty reduction, and transition from relief to develop-
ment. Exceptions are Colic-Peisker’s paper on the labour 
integration of Bosnian refugees in Australia, Long’s discus-
sion of the labour migration and durable solutions, Umlas’s 
review of urban refugees’ right to work and UNHCR advo-
cacy, and Ott’s review of the labour market integration of 
resettled refugees, out of a corpus of 196 evaluations and 271 
research papers.63
Nonetheless, it seems that the UNHCR is focusing 
increasingly on the diversity of situations of the refu-
gee worker, as Ott’s study shows. In part this the result of 
UNHCR responsiveness to NGO demands on the issue, 
even though NGOs deplore lack of implementation of this 
apparent conceptual shift.64 So far, a similar evolution is not 
observed at the ILO.65
These observations contribute to scholarship pointing 
at the historical association of the label of “refugee” with 
humanitarian crises, and its dissociation from economic 
activities, except when the latter are challenging the genu-
ineness of the refugee (e.g., the pejorative character of the 
“economic refugee”).66 More conceptually, exclusive empha-
sis on promotion of livelihood strategies in utterly precar-
ious situations (refugee camps and post-conflict societies 
where work is scarce) bears the risk of what Barnett and 
Finnemore label the “normalization of deviance,” that is, in 
this case, the legitimization of a conception of labour that 
deviates from full recognition of the right to work. The 
UNHCR’s broader focus on the refugee worker can contrib-
ute to prevent this normalization, and change in this respect 
within the ILO could encourage normative realignment and 
cooperation between both agencies.
Conclusion
The article has highlighted the potential and limits of 
UNHCR-ILO activities promoting refugees’ right to work 
in the 21st century. It has uncovered a solid normative basis 
for cooperation and sustained technical collaboration in the 
field over several years, resulting in practical innovations 
and knowledge diffusion between both IOs and to other 
partners. Were this analysis to stop in 2007, one could argue, 
drawing on Barnett and Finnemore, that the UNHCR and 
the ILO were jointly reinforcing their authority as they 
appeared in harmony on norm definition (agreement about 
the population of concern and their rights, and division of 
labour to better assist them) while embracing norm diffu-
sion between them and outwardly. Yet bureaucratic pathol-
ogies were already prevalent before 2007, especially cultural 
contestation, bureaucratic universalism, and insulation. It 
can be assumed that these pathologies were exacerbated 
after 2007, given the inauspicious character of the inter-
national environment, but perhaps also because of each 
agency’s expansion in other directions and reach towards 
other actors (UNHCR’s broader promotion of livelihood 
and stronger linkages with NGOs on this issue, ILO’s focus 
on domestic work). Cooperation between the UNHCR and 
ILO was weakened in this context.
It could be argued that the UNHCR’s authority was left less 
diminished than that of the ILO in this particular field, even 
though the ILO is far less associated with refugee protection 
than the UNHCR. Since 2007, the UNHCR has increased its 
strategic focus on refugee livelihoods, while joint activities 
with the ILO were marginalized. The ILO did not rediscover 
the issue for itself, yet still appears as a knowledge provider 
in the field, even though this is barely visible at headquar-
ter level. While the right to work has been affirmed within 
a number of projects, this is hard to say of rights at work, 
given the context. Increasing the organizational visibility 
of field activities focused on the refugee worker as well as 
normative entrepreneurship, as recommended in the 1983 
MoU, would certainly contribute to account for the polit-
ical and multi-faceted nature of the socio-economic rights 
of refugees.67
Conceptually, the findings inform the critical study of 
migration management as they systematize factors that 
affect the authority of cooperating IOs, adding a stronger 
focus on how migration IOs work to Newland and Betts’s 
analyses of competition and cooperation in global migra-
tion governance.68 The analysis also shows that Barnett and 
Finnemore’s bureaucratic perspective on IOs not only helps 
to grasp the strengths and weaknesses of single IOs, but 
also explains how internal dynamics can impede promising 
joint initiatives. This is relevant not just for the study of the 
global migration governance architecture, but potentially 
for any area of global governance in which IOs pursue joint 
initiatives. Further research on IOs cooperation in auspi-
cious and less auspicious international environments would 
help put the present case study in perspective and nurture 
conceptual questions, such as on the usefulness of particu-
lar bureaucratic pathologies for cooperation, how bureau-
cratic pathology in one IO can “infect” another IO via 
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socialization in the context of joint projects, and whether 
IO cooperation can prevent bureaucratic pathologies.
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